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A Healthy Solution for Patients and
Patents: How India's Legal Victory
Against a Pharmaceutical Giant
Reconciles Human Rights with
Intellectual Property Rights
ABSTRACT

The Swiss drug company Novartis challenged India's status as
the "Pharmacyof the Developing World" when it initiated a lawsuit
against the Indian government on February 15, 2007. In 2005, India
updated it PatentsAct to comply with the World Trade Organization's
(WTO) intellectual property requirements. Before 2005, India only
granted patents to processes, not products, which facilitated the
development of the country's booming generic drug industry. On
January 25, 2006, India's Office of the Controller General of Patents,
Designs and Trademarks denied Novartis's patent application for its
cancer-fighting drug Glivec on the grounds that it was not
substantially different from an earlier,unpatented version of the drug.
Novartis challenged both the constitutionalityof the Indian PatentsAct
and its compliance with the WTO's Agreement on Trade-Related
Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS). While the Indian
High Court asserted that it lacked jurisdiction to rule on the Indian
Patents Act's compliance with TRIPS, it determined that the Act was
constitutionaland did not require further amendments.
The Novartis decision has had important implications for both
developed countries that house the pharmaceutical industry and
developing countries that cannot afford patented versions of essential
medications.
Had Novartis won its case against the Indian
government, the practice of granting patents for inventions that
resulted from "evergreening"would not only have been tolerated but
protected, thus striking a serious blow to developing countries that rely
on generic drugs from India.
This note analyzes the controversial section of India's Patents
Act by comparing its language to the TRIPS Agreement, the Doha
Declarationon the TRIPS Agreement and Public Health, and similar
laws of India's fellow WTO members. In conclusion, the note asserts
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that although India's Patents Act is TRIPS compliant, the Indian
government should more clearly define the relevant criteria for
determining whether a particular modified drug has sufficiently
enhanced its efficacy in order to qualify for patent protection. Finally,
the note argues that India's decision to protect its pharmaceutical
industry and the health of the developing world through section 3(d) of
its Patents Act, rather than by relying on compulsory licenses, is a
solution that should be employed by other developing countries
concerned with TRIPS compliance.
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A HEALTHY SOLUTION

This [decision] is a huge relief for millions of patients and doctors in developing
countries who depend on affordable medicines from India.
1
- Tido von Schon-Angerer
There's no faster way to kill access to the latest life-saving drugs for people in
India than to avoid offering patent protection.
- John Gilardi

2

Your life may depend on a patent. According to several public
health advocates and organizations, this statement is not an
exaggeration. 3 Intellectual property rights and human rights are
4
often at odds where the pharmaceutical industry is concerned.
Generating profits and increasing access to essential medications are
often incompatible goals. Therefore, there will always exist a certain
tension between pharmaceutical companies that research and develop
new drugs to combat the world's maladies and third world countries
unable to afford the patented versions of such drugs. Due to the
human rights implications of this tension, this polarizing subject
continues to surface in international forums and spark heated debate
among state
governments,
pharmaceutical
companies,
nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), and human rights groups. Most
recently, the debate made international headlines when the Indian
High Court in Madras handed down a decision against Novartis, a
Swiss pharmaceutical company, on August 6, 2007. 5 The case
1.
Novartis Patent Challenge Dismissed in India, 11 BRIDGES: WKLY TRADE NEWS
DIG., Sept. 5, 2007, http://www.ictsd.org/weekly/07-09-05/story3.htm (quoting Tido von
Schon-Angerer, Director of the M6dicins Sans Fronti6res campaign for access to essential
medicines).
2.
Adam Beaumont, NGOs Attack Novartis Over Drug Access, SWISSINFO, Oct. 12,
2006,
http://www.swissinfo.org/eng/In-depth/detail/NGOs-attackNovartisoverdrug_
access.html?siteSect=lO7&sid=7159190&cKey=1160714785000
(quoting John Gilardi,
Novartis spokesman).
3.
See MEDICINS SANS FRONTIkRES, A MATTER OF LIFE & DEATH: THE ROLE OF
PATENTS
IN
ACCESS
TO
ESSENTIAL
MEDICINES
(Nov.
2001)
http://www.doctorswithoutborders.org/publications/reports/200/ldoha-1 1-2001 .pdf (stating
that people in developing nations are dying because patents are interfering with access to
life-saving medicines); Seth Shulman, In Africa, Patents Kill, TECH. REV., Apr. 2001,
http://www.technologyreview.com/Biotech/12348/ (discussing the negative impact of
Western drug patents on African AIDS patients).
4.
For a discussion of the growing tensions between human rights and intellectual
property law, of which pharmaceutical patents are just one important example, see
Laurence R. Helfer, Toward a Human Rights Framework for Intellectual Property, 40 U.C.
DAVIS L. REV. 971 (2007).
5.
Novartis v. Union of India, W.P. Nos. 24759 & 24760 of 2006 (Madras H.C.
June 8, 2007), available at http://judis.nic.in/chennai/qrydisp.asp?tfnm=11121; see Tatum
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highlighted a potential conflict between Indian patent law and the
intellectual property protection requirements of the World Trade
Organization (WTO).
Before India joined the WTO in 1995, it had been "a patent-free
zone where generic drug-makers flourished." 6 Although India had
allowed pharmaceutical patents for manufacturing processes used to
produce drugs before it decided to join the WTO, it had not permitted
patents for products. 7 This system was designed "to encourage
companies to compete in low-cost manufacturing, developing the
nation's industry and making medicines widely available at low
prices." 8 When India decided to join the WTO, it had to agree to
update its patent laws in order to comply with the WTO's TradeRelated Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS) Agreement. 9
Since the WTO categorized India as a developing nation, TRIPS
granted the country ten years to update its patent laws to conform
fully to WTO standards. 10 India's Patents (Amendment) Act 2005
(Patents Act) requires India to provide patents on a much larger and
specific scale-including patents on pharmaceuticals-in order to
comply with the WTO's minimum protections for intellectual
property.1 1
These stricter standards present a challenge for India's
pharmaceutical industry since it largely depends on its ability to
produce generic drugs for much cheaper prices than its patented
counterparts. 12 Although the Indian government asserts that its
Anderson, Rejected Novartis Cases Leave India's TRIPS Compliance Unchallenged, INTELL.
PROP. WATCH, Aug. 7, 2007, http://www.ip-watch.org/weblog/index.php?p=712&res
=1280_ff&print=O; Amelia Gentleman, Setback for Novartis in India Over Drug Patent,
N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 7, 2007, at Cl; Sheila Mathrani, World Opinion Was Against Novartis,
ECON. TIMES, Aug. 7, 2007, http://economictimes.indiatimes.comarticleshow/2260885.cms.
6.
Victoria Gill, Novartis Loses Landmark Indian Patent Law Case, CHEMISTRY
WORLD, Sept. 2007, http://www.rsc.org/chemistryworld/Issues/2007/September/Novartis
LosesLandmarklndianPatentLawCase.asp.
John S. James, India Changes Patent Law To Meet WTO Treaty, Making New
7.
Medicines Less Available to Most Citizens, Other Countries, AIDS TREATMENT NEWS, Dec.
31, 2004, http://www.aidsnews.org/2004/12/india-patent.html.
8.
Id.
See Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, Apr.
9.
15, 1994, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex 1C,
Legal Instruments-Results of the Uruguay Round, 108 Stat. 4809, 33 I.L.M. 81, available
TRIPS
[hereinafter
at http://www.wto.org/english/docse/legal-e/legal-e.htm#TRIPs
Agreement].
Gill, supra note 6.
10.
11.
The Patents (Amendment) Act, 2005, No. 15, Acts of Parliament, 2005, § 3(d),
available at http://www.patentoffice.nic.in/ipr/patent/patent_2005.pdf
See Meredith Dearborn, India Restricts Generic Drugs, YES! MAG., Summer
12.
2005, http://www.yesmagazine.org/article.asp?ID=1295.
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updated patent laws are "WTO compliant," India does not want to
threaten its position as the "Pharmacy of the Developing World" by
making its updated laws too restrictive on the domestic
pharmaceutical industry. 13
Specifically, the Indian government
rejected the widespread industry practice of extending a drug's period
of patentability by making minor, insignificant alterations to
14
medications, commonly known as "evergreening."'
In an attempt to test the boundaries of India's updated patent
laws, Novartis filed suit against the Indian government on February
15, 2007, after India's Office of the Controller General of Patents,
Designs and Trademarks (Patent Office) had refused to grant a patent
to the drug-maker's cancer-treating medicine Glivec. 15 According to
the Patent Office, the new version of Glivec was not sufficiently
different from the old, unprotected version to warrant a patent. 16 This
meant that the Indian pharmaceutical industry could continue
producing the generic form of the drug for a much cheaper price than
if the drug were patented. 17 Novartis clearly recognized the negative
impact this decision by India's Patent Office would have on its
8
potential profits for a patented version of Glivec.1
In its complaint, Novartis argued that India's Patents Act
violated both the Indian constitution and WTO standards.1 9
Specifically, Novartis claimed that section 3(d) of the Act, denying
patents to "a new form of a known substance which does not result in
the enhancement of the known efficacy of that substance," 20 was too
vague to be enforceable. 2' In addition, Novartis pointed out that the

13.
See Press Release, M6dicins Sans Fronti6res, Indian Court Ruling in Novartis
Case Protects India as the "Pharmacy of the Developing World," (Aug. 6, 2007),
http://www.accessmed-msf.org/media-room/press-releases/.
14.
See Novartis Patent Challenge Dismissed in India,supra note 1.
15.
Novartis v. Union of India, W.P. Nos. 24759 & 24760 of 2006, at para. 1
(Madras H.C. June 8, 2007), available at http://judis.nic.inlchennai/qrydisp.asp?tfnm=
11121; see Gentleman, supra note 5 (noting that the drug is called Gleevec in the United
States).
16.
See Gill, supra note 6.
17.
Press Release, Oxfam International, Novartis Lawsuit Threatens Access to
Medicines
for
Millions
(Jan. 29,
2007),
http://www.oxfam.org/en/news/2007/
pr070219-novartis ("Glivec sells for $27,000 per patient per year in India, but the generic
version sells for $2,000 per patient per year.").
18.
See id.
19.
Novartis, W.P. Nos. 24759 & 24760 of 2006, at para. 2; Press Release, M6dicins
Sans Fronti~res, supra note 13.
20.
The Patents (Amendment) Act, 2005, No. 15, Acts of Parliament, 2005, § 3(d),
availableat http://www.patentoffice.nic.in/ipr/patent/patent_2005.pdf
21.
Novartis, W.P. Nos. 24759 & 24760 of 2006, at para. 2; see Novartis Patent
Challenge Dismissed in India, supra note 1.
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law also specifically "denies patent protection to new versions of drugs
invented before 1995," the year India joined the WTO. 22 Novartis was

particularly frustrated with the Patent Office's decision because
patents for the beta crystal form of Glivec 23 had been granted in
24
nearly forty other countries, including Russia, Taiwan, and China.
However, despite Novartis's detailed and specific objections to India's
25
new patent laws, the Indian High Court dismissed the suit.

The Indian High Court's decision to deny Novartis's challenge
to India's Patents Act has far-reaching implications for the global
community. The decision to uphold the Act protects India's hugely
successful generic pharmaceutical industry because "[tihe stringent
standards of patentability upheld by the court mean that fewer
medicines will be eligible for patents."26 However, the Indian High
Court declined to address Novartis's claim that India's Patents Act
violated the TRIPS requirements, asserting that it lacked jurisdiction
to rule on international treaties. 27 The court suggested that the WTO
was the proper forum in which Novartis could challenge India's
28
compliance with TRIPS.
Not surprisingly, NGOs and aid organizations such as M6dicins
Sans Fronti~res (Doctors Without Borders), which had sponsored a
petition signed by almost half a million people urging Novartis to drop
the case, praised the Indian High Court's ruling as a victory for the
"'rights of patients over patents."' 29 By contrast, Novartis argued that
the decision "will have long-term negative consequences for research
and development into better medicines. ' 30 While the decision made
31
international headlines, the news generated equal attention in India.
22.
Novartis, W.P. Nos. 24759 & 24760 of 2006, at para. 2; see Gentleman, supra
note 5.
23.
See infra notes 72-73 and accompanying text.
24.
Press Release, Novartis, Novartis Concerned Indian Court Ruling Will
Discourage Investments in Innovation Needed to Bring Better Medicines to Patients (June
8, 2007), http://cws.huginonline.com/N/134323/PR200708/1144199_5_2.html.
25.
See Novartis Patent Challenge Dismissed in India, supra note 1.

26.

Id.

27.
Novartis, W.P. Nos. 24759 & 24760 of 2006, at para. 4.
28.
Novartis Patent Challenge Dismissed in India, supra note 1
29.
Gentleman, supra note 5.
30.
Press Release, Novartis, supra note 24.
31.
See Praful Bidwai, Health-India: Novartis Patents Case Far from Dead, INTER
PRESS SERVICE, Aug. 9, 2007, http://ipsnews.net/news.asp?idnews=38840;
Rajesh
Chandramouli, Novartis Loses Fight for Cancer Drug Patent, TIMES OF INDIA, Aug. 7, 2007,
http://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/India/Novartis-loses-ight-for-cancer -drug-patent/artic
leshow/2260719.cms; Feroz Ali K, Novartis: Do Indian Patent Laws Stifle Research?,
HINDU, Aug. 9, 2007, http://www.hindu.com/seta/2007/08/09/stories/2007080950161500
.htm.
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The head of the Mumbai cancer patients' support group, Y. K. Sapru,
was thrilled with the decision, stating:
"This is a very major victory domestically and internationally .... India has a $5
billion pharma industry, and 65 percent of those drugs are sold to the developing
world and poorer people in the developed world. All that would have been
have been a
suspended if the judgment had gone the other way, and there3 would
2
dearth of affordable drugs. That calamity has been prevented.

Supporters of India's pharmaceutical industry clearly viewed the
decision as a victory for both India's pharmaceutical industry and the
developing world.
Although Novartis claims that it has no current plans to
request that the Swiss government bring the case before the WTO, the
company has already appealed the Patent Office's earlier denial of the
requested patent to India's Intellectual Property Appellate Board
(IPAB), a procedure entirely separate from its lawsuit challenging
India's Patents Act. 33 Regardless of the outcome of Novartis's appeal
before the IPAB, the Indian High Court's interpretation of India's
challenged patent law may be rendered moot if the Indian government
responds to pressure from WTO Members to amend its already34
updated patent laws.
This note argues that India should not acquiesce to pressure
from developed countries within the WTO to amend the controversial
wording of section 3(d) of India's Patents Act because the language of
the Act satisfies TRIPS requirements. Additionally, the language of
India's Patents Act, while strikingly similar to patent laws of other
WTO members, attempts to achieve the same goals as those of other
members. Thus, if India's Patents Act is not considered TRIPS
compliant, then neither are the laws of several other prominent WTO
members. 35 India's victory against Novartis should encourage WTO
members to reassess their own patent law regimes in light of both the
TRIPS Agreement and the Doha Declaration on the TRIPS Agreement
and Public Health (Doha Declaration).
Part I of this note contextualizes the WTO's plan to
internationalize intellectual property rights through the TRIPS
Agreement. In particular, this part discusses the WTO's concessions
to the developing world through an analysis of the Doha Declaration
and the effects of patent "evergreening" on developing countries'
access to essential medications. Part I will also address India's
32.
Gentleman, supra note 5 (quoting Y.K. Sapru, head of Mumbai cancer patient's
support group).
33.
Press Release, Novartis, supra note 24.
See Bidwai, supra note 31.
34.
See infra notes 150-71 and accompanying text.
35.
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reasoning behind the controversial section 3(d) of India's updated
Patents Act, as well as the specifics of Novartis's challenge to the Act.
Part II discusses whether India's Patents Act offers sufficient
protection for intellectual property rights according to TRIPS
requirements and compares the language of section 3(d) to similar
provisions contained in the patent laws of other WTO Members. Part
III argues that although India's updated Patents Act satisfies WTO
requirements, the Indian government should more clearly define the
criteria for determining whether a particular modified drug has
sufficiently enhanced its efficacy in order to qualify for patent
protection. Finally, in Part III, this note asserts that India's decision
to protect its pharmaceutical industry and the health of the
developing world through section 3(d) of its Patents Act, rather than
by relying on compulsory licenses, is a solution that should be
employed by other developing countries concerned with TRIPS
compliance.
I. STRENGTHENING INTERNATIONAL PATENT PROTECTION: THE EFFECT
OF THE TRIPS AGREEMENT ON DEVELOPING COUNTRIES

Before the WTO adopted the TRIPS Agreement in 1994,
countries were able to determine whether they would grant patents
and how to design their patent systems. 36
Several countries
37
pharmaceuticals.
for
patents
grant
to
specifically decided not
However, the coming into force of the TRIPS Agreement and the
expiration of most of its transitional periods meant that all major
WTO members had to adopt patent laws to apply to
pharmaceuticals.3 8 This current patent-friendly environment allows
inventors to obtain patents for newly invented, or in some cases
''enhanced," pharmaceutical products in order to prevent competitors
from creating cheaper generic versions of the drug for the duration of
39
the patent's life.
While this new arrangement protects the intellectual property
rights of drug developers, it also creates tension with developing
countries that are unable to afford patented medication. In the years
following the coming into force of TRIPS, discontent with the
agreement began to surface in developing countries, especially in

36.

HOLGER HESTERMEYER, HUMAN RIGHTS AND THE

WTO:

THE CASE OF PATENTS

AND ACCESS TO MEDICINES xxxiv (2007); see TRIPS Agreement, supra note 9.
37.
HESTERMEYER, supra note 36, at xxxiv.

38.
39.

Id.
Id.

2008]

A HEALTHY SOLUTION

India and Brazil. 40 One former Indian Supreme Court judge warned
that "the WTO may well spell re-colonisation [sic] of the newly freed
nations."4 1
After a few years of withstanding pressure from
developing countries, the developed countries within the WTO
determined that dissatisfaction regarding the 42third world's access to
essential medicines could no longer be ignored.
A. Appeasing Developing Countries via TRIPS and the Doha
Declaration
TRIPS was supposed to be the WTO's answer to the dilemma.
However, even though it added a level of predictability to traderelated intellectual property rights, it also initiated controversy
regarding the imbalance of benefits that it established between
developed countries and the third world. 43 In June 2001, at a special
session of the TRIPS Council, the WTO's then-Director General, Mike
Moore, described the goal of the session:
[The TRIPS Agreement] strikes a carefully-negotiated balance between providing
intellectual property protection-which is essential if new medicines and
treatments are to be developed-and allowing countries the flexibility to ensure
that treatments reach the world's poorest and most vulnerable people.
Countries must feel that they can use this flexibility. The work started today in
44
the TRIPS Council should reinforce that security.

After several contentious debates regarding the balance between
patents and human rights, the TRIPS Council passed the Doha
45
Declaration.
The Doha Declaration's attempt to balance the interests of both
developed and developing countries is apparent from the beginning of
the document. The Declaration begins by recognizing "the gravity of
the public health problems afflicting many developing and least-

40.
Id at 48.
41.
Id. (quoting Krishna Iyer, former Indian Supreme Court judge).
42.
Id. at 255; see Laurence R. Helfer, Regime Shifting: The TRIPs Agreement and
New Dynamics of InternationalIntellectualProperty Lawmaking, 29 YALE J. INT'L L. 1, 4245 (2004).
43.
See World Trade Organization, Understanding the WTO: The Agreements;
Intellectual Property: Protection and Enforcement, http://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/
whatise/tif.e/agrm7_.e.htm (last visited Feb. 21, 2008) [hereinafter World Trade
Organization, Intellectual Property: Protection and Enforcement]; see also HESTERMEYER,
supra note 36, at 256.
44.
Press Release, World Trade Organization, Moore: Countries Must Feel Secure
That They Can Use TRIPS' Flexibility, (June 20, 2001), http://www.wto.org/
english/news-e/news0l-e/dg-trips-medicines_010620_e.htm.
45.
HESTERMEYER, supra note 36, at 257.
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developed countries, especially those resulting from HIV/AIDS,
tuberculosis, malaria and other epidemics." 46 While WTO members
stress the importance of intellectual property protection in developing
countries for the creation of new medicines, they also "recognize the
concerns about its effects on prices." 47 Additionally, the Doha
Declaration concedes that "the TRIPS Agreement does not and should
not prevent Members from taking measures to protect public health,"
and it supports the "WTO Members' right to protect public health and,
48
in particular, to promote access to medicines for all."
While the Doha Declaration espouses the principles of fairness
and flexibility with regard to the TRIPS Agreement, the language of
the document cleverly balances the goal of accommodating developing
members' concerns while recognizing developed members' reluctance
to alter the TRIPS Agreement. 49 For example, the signatories agreed
"to reaffirm the commitment of developed-country Members to provide
incentives to their enterprises and institutions to promote and
encourage technology transfer to least-developed country Members
pursuant to Article 66.2" of the TRIPS Agreement. 50 However, the
Doha Declaration also permits developing countries to issue
compulsory licenses in the form of government-mandated patent
exceptions, and it leaves each member free to determine what
constitutes a national public health emergency. 5' In theory, these
important concessions to developing countries were intended to serve
as reassurance that intellectual property rights would not overshadow
the sovereign right of a nation to protect its citizens during a public
health emergency. In actuality, developed members of the WTO have
repeatedly opposed developing members' decisions to issue compulsory
52
licenses.

46.
See Declaration on the TRIPS Agreement and Public Health, Nov. 14, 2001, 4th
Sess., Doha Ministerial Conference, WT/MIN(01)/DEC/2 at para. 1 (Nov. 20, 2001),
available at http://www.wto.org/english/thewtoe/ministe/min01_e/mindecl-trips-e.htm
[hereinafter Doha Declaration].
47.
Id. at para. 3.
48.
Id. at para. 4.
49.
HESTERMEYER, supra note 36, at 259.
50.
Doha Declaration, supra note 46, at para. 7.
51.
Id. at para. 5(b)-(c).
52.
See Do Hyung Kim, Research Guide on TRIPS and Compulsory Licensing:
Access to Innovative Pharmaceuticals for Least Developed Countries, GLOBALEX (Feb.
2007),
http://www.nyulawglobal.org/globalex/TRIPS-Compulsory-Licensing.htm# A.
Ambiguities. ofCompulsory%20Licens ("[M]any still argue that the compulsory licensing
provisions have not helped bring drugs to those in need. Some low-income nations like
Thailand, Colombia, and South Africa have been pressured by powerful nations like the
U.S. to adopt more rigorous intellectual property laws during free trade negotiations.").
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Although the Doha Declaration makes several concessions
regarding the potential flexibility of intellectual property rights for
developing countries, there is disagreement within the international
community about the legal status of the Declaration. 53 While a
"declaration" is technically not a legally binding document, most
54
authors view the Doha Declaration as binding on its members.
Additionally, no member has questioned whether the Doha
55
Declaration constitutes an interpretation of the TRIPS Agreement.
Thus, "it is most convincing to regard the Declaration as a binding
56
authoritative interpretation."
B. The Difficulty of Discouraging"Evergreening"While Promoting
"IncrementalInnovation"
The Doha Declaration allows developing countries to protect
the health of their populations by circumventing the TRIPS
Agreement's patent protection during situations of "extreme
urgency," 57 recognizing the effects of intellectual property protection
Nevertheless, pharmaceutical companies
on medication prices. 58
continue to attempt to extend the lives of their already-existing
patents for as long as possible.5 9 Although pharmaceutical companies
play a crucial role in improving the health of the world's population,
the pharmaceutical industry seeks to turn a large profit from its
investments in developing new medications, just as India intends to
60
preserve its lucrative niche in the generic drug market.

53.
HESTERMEYER, supra note 36, at 279.
54.
Id. at 279-80.
55.
Id. at 281.
Id.
56.
57.
Doha Declaration, supra note 46, at para. 5(c).
58.
Id. at para. 3.
See Edson Beas Rodrigues, Jr. & Bryan Murphy, Comment, Brazil's Prior
59.
Consent Law: A Dialogue Between Brazil and the United States Over Where the TRIPS
Agreement Currently Sets the Balance Between the Protection of Pharmaceutical Patents
and Access to Medicines, 16 ALB. L.J. SCI. & TECH. 423, 431 (2006).
See TRIPS Agreement, supra note 9, pmbl. The TRIPS Agreement addresses
60.
the pharmaceutical industry's concerns in the beginning of the Agreement by recognizing
that intellectual property rights are "private rights." Id.; see also Malvinder Mohan Singh,
Jan.
4,
2008,
ECON.
TIMES,
India Now
Emerging as Roaring Tiger,
http://economictimes.indiatimes.com/Features/Corporate-Dossier/India-now-emerging-asroaring-.tiger/rssarticleshow/2673478.cms (noting that it is "estimated that drugs worth
$70 billion, will additionally go off patent in the next few years, thus opening up a huge
market opportunity for Indian companies"); Press Release, Oxfam International, supra
note 17 ("Glivec sells for $27,000 per patient per year in India, but the generic version sells
for $2,000 per patient per year.").
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While newly discovered uses and improved versions of existing
drugs undoubtedly benefit patients, it is important to distinguish
between innovations that advance the industry's ability to produce
new drugs and those that are designed solely to extend the patent life
of already-existing drugs.
The Pharmaceutical Research and
Manufacturers of America (PhRMA) asserts that second-use patents
are "'conducive to future research and development of life-saving
medicines."' 61 "Second and subsequent use patents protect discoveries
of new uses for [the same] substances, active principles, molecules, or
compounds that have been previously patented or are already [on the
market. '"62 Additionally, drug manufacturers frequently attempt to
63
increase the effectiveness of a drug so that it warrants a new patent.
These processes, referred to as "incremental innovation," are
distinguishable from "evergreening," which occurs when a drug
manufacturer 'stockpiles' patent protection by obtaining separate 2064
year patents on multiple attributes of a single product."
The practice of obtaining multiple patents on similar
inventions prevents the introduction of generic drugs into the market
and allows for the possibility that patents on certain multi-use drugs
could run indefinitely. 65 The ability of companies to acquire additional
patents on the same drugs forms a cornerstone of the industry. 66 The
National Institute of Health Care Management Research and
Education Foundation conducted a study in May 2002 and found that,
"between 1989 and 2000, only 35% out of the 1035 new drugs
approved by the USFDA entailed a new active principle." 6 7 In other
words, pharmaceutical companies were able to extend the lives of
nearly two-thirds of their already-patented drugs by making
alterations to the drugs' methods of production, forms, or uses.
Furthermore, in India "'[t]here are an estimated 9,000 patent
applications waiting to be reviewed by Indian authorities of which
roughly 7,000 are believed to be modifications of old drugs."' 68 This
61.
Martin Vaughan, Groups Decry Impact of IP and Health Terms in US Trade
Agreements, INTELL. PROP. WATCH, Mar. 3, 2006, http://www.ip-watch.org/weblog/
index.php?p=236 (quoting Ken Johnson, a senior vice-president of PhRMA).
62.
Rodrigues, Jr. & Murphy, supra note 59, at 430 (citation omitted).
63.
See Ajit Dangi, Does Indian Patent Law Stifle Innovation?, BUS. STANDARD,
Aug. 24, 2007, http://www.rediff.com/money/2007/aug/24deb.htm.
64.
European
Generic
Medicines
Association,
Evergreening,
2004,
http://www.egagenerics.com/gen-evergrn.htm (last visited Feb. 21, 2008).
65.
See Rodrigues, Jr. & Murphy, supra note 59, at 431.
66.
See id.
67.
Id.
68.
Press Release, Oxfam International, supra note 17 (quoting Celine Charveriat,
Oxfam's Make Trade Fair head).

2008]

A HEALTHY SOLUTION

means that developing countries with limited resources may be denied
access to previously patented medications by virtue of their newly
discovered uses or altered forms. While it is undoubtedly important to
encourage innovative uses for drugs that are already on the market,
this poses a particularly difficult situation for developing countries
that are waiting for patents on drugs to expire so that they can
purchase cheaper, generic versions.
C. Novartis's Challenge to India's PatentsAct
Novartis decided to enter the Indian market during the period
when India began the process of updating its patent laws to comply
with the requirements of the WTO's TRIPS Agreement. 69 The
company formally entered India in 1998, before the government
amended its 1970 Patents Act. 70 Although Novartis obtained patents
for Glivec in the United States and other countries in 1993, it did not
attempt to secure a patent for Glivec in India until 1998.71 Since
72
Glivec was not patented in India, generic forms of the imatinib-free
73
base drug could be made available to cancer patients in the country.

69.

See Ali K, supra note 31.

70.
Id.
71.
Id. In January 2003, India granted Novartis Exclusive Marketing Rights (EMR)
to Glivec. Cancer Patients Aid Association, The Glivec Story, http://www.cpaaindia.org
aboutus/theglivecstory.htm (last visited Feb. 21, 2008). Thereafter, "Indian courts forbade 6
out of 9 generic producers to market Imatanib Mesylate." Id. Although this benefited
Novartis, there were negative consequences for the Indian people as Glivec was not
affordable for many. See id.
As a result: The 3 generic companies could not cover the entire country, CPAA
and other charitable agencies could not take up the burden of supplying the drug
at subsidized rates or free. Thousands of CML patients suffered and many
became bankrupt as they tried to buy Glivec and many even died.
Id.
72.
See Medline Plus, Imatinib, http://www.nlm.nih.gov/medlineplus/druginfo/
medmaster/a606018.html (last visited Feb. 21, 2008) (describing the uses and molecular
composition of imatinib).
73.
See Novartis Stops Donation of Cancer Drug to India, NEWINDPRESS.COM, June
6, 2003,
http://www.newindpress.comlNewsitems.asp?ID=IEH20030605152229&Title=
Top+Stories&rLink=0 (noting that Novartis had previously provided India with free
supplies of Glivec on the condition that India would not produce generic versions of the
drug). "Novartis has other patents covering imatinib in similar ways. Take for example,
WO 2007023182 for Delta and Epsilon Crystal Forms of Imatinib Mesylate." See Posting of
Duncan Bucknell to SPICY IP, http://spicyipindia.blogspot.com2008/01/glivec-gleevecimatinib-novartis-many.html (Jan. 14, 2008, 18:56). Forty other countries have granted
patents for the new beta crystal form of the drug for which India denied a patent. See
Novartis.com, Frequently Asked Questions, http://www.novartis.comlnewsroomlindiaglivec-patent-case/faq.shtml#2 (last visited Feb. 21, 2008).
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When Novartis finally presented its application for an updated
form of Glivec to the Indian Patent Office in 1998, the patent was
placed in a "mailbox" 74 until India's Patents Act was updated and no
longer provided patents for "a new form of a known substance." 75 The
Patent Office evaluated Novartis's application for an enhanced form of
Glivec pursuant to amended section 3(d) of India's 2005 Patents Act,
which provides instructions regarding the granting of patents for
the mere discovery of a new form of a known substance which does not result in the
enhancement of the known efficacy of that substance or the mere discovery of any
new property or new use for a known substance or of the mere use of a known
process, machine or apparatus unless76such known process results in a new product
or employs at least one new reactant.

Although Novartis attempted to demonstrate an enhancement of the
drug's efficacy before the Patent Controller, the Patent Office
determined that Novartis's data was not convincing evidence that the
drug's efficacy had been sufficiently enhanced in accordance with
India's Patents Act. 77 Novartis responded to the Controller's decision
not to grant the patent by initiating two separate proceedings. First,
it appealed the Patent Office's decision to the Intellectual Property
Appellate Board, hoping that the IPAB would reconsider the Patent
Office's denial. 78 Second, Novartis directly challenged section 3(d) of

74.
Press Release, Health Global Access Project, Fact Sheet: Changes to India's
Patents Act and Access to Affordable Generic Medicines After January 1, 2005, (Dec. 14,
2004),
http://www.healthgap.org/press releases/04/121404_HGAPFSINDIA-patent.pdf
(citing rule 70.8 of TRIPS that required India to establish a "'mailbox' where patent
applications could be filed between 1995 and 2005. After January 1, 2005, the mailbox
[was] opened, and requests for patents considered by the Indian Patent Office.").
75.
Patent Office Order India-Glivec, Decision, Patent No. 16021MAS/1998 (denied
Jan. 25, 2006) available at http://www.scribd.com/doc/416824/Patent-office-Order-IndiaGlivec; see Novartis v. Union of India, W.P. Nos. 24759 & 24760 of 2006, at para. 5 (Madras
H.C. June 8, 2007), available at http://judis.nic.in/chennai/qrydisp.asp?tfnm=11121; P.T.
Jyothi Datta, 2-Member Bench Can Look into Novartis's Glivec Case, Says HC, HINDU Bus.
LINE,
Nov.
14,
2007,
http://www.thehindubusinessline.com/2007/11/14/stories/
2007111452110300.htm (reporting that the Indian Patent Office rejected Novartis's
application in January 2006); Posting of Shamnad Basheer to SPICY IP,
http://spicyipindia.blogspot.com/2006/03/first-mailbox-opposition-gleevec.html
(Mar. 11,
2006, 15:47) (stating that the key grounds for the patent's rejection "were that the mailbox
application claimed a crystal form (Beta) version of Imatinib Mesyklate (the generic name
for Gleevec) and that this was already known in 1993. The application therefore lacked
novelty and inventiveness").
76.
The Patents (Amendment) Act, 2005, No. 15, Acts of Parliament, 2005, § 3(d)
available at http://www.patentoffice.nic.in/ipr/patent/patent 2005.pdf.
77.
See Novartis Loses Patent Claim on Cancer Drug, SIFY, Jan. 26, 2006,
http://sify.com/finance/fullstory.php?id=14127695; see also Ali K, supra note 31 (noting that
Novartis offered evidence showing that the drug had "an enhanced bioavailability of 30
percent in studies conducted on rats").
78.
See Press Release, Novartis, supra note 24.

2008]

A HEALTHY SOLUTION

India's Patents Act in the High Court, claiming that the Act was
"arbitrary, illogical, vague," and unconstitutional, 79 and that it
violated India's compliance with the TRIPS Agreement.8 0
Since evergreening and incremental innovation are not often
easily distinguishable and section 3(d) uses neither of these terms, the
Indian High Court attempted to clarify the rationale behind the law.8 1
The High Court viewed "enhancement of a known efficacy" as a term
of art, arguing that Novartis, "being [a] pharmaceutical giant in the
whole of the world, [could not] plead that they [did] not know what is
meant by enhancement of a known efficacy."8 2 The court went on to
assert that the Patent Controller did not abuse his discretion in
rejecting the Glivec application8 3 and that section 3(d) of the Patents
84
Act did not violate India's constitution.
Proponents and opponents of pharmaceutical patents have
analyzed the Indian High Court's reading of section 3(d) of India's
Patents Act very differently. For example, advocates of the decision
assert that the law is meant "to allow genuine improvements and at
the same time bar frivolous 'tweaking' which are passed under the
garb of incremental innovation."8 5 Supporters also herald section 3(d)
as a "trendsetting provision," and view it as "the first legal provision
in the world not to be found in the patent legislation of any country,
which provides a check on frivolous patenting."8 6 In other words,
supporters of India's Patents Act view section 3(d) as a check on
"evergreening." However, opponents argue that the law's requirement
of "enhancement of the known efficacy" of a drug stifles "incremental
innovation." ' Carrie Scott, spokesperson for Novartis, asserted that
Novartis's case before the Indian High Court was always about
understanding 'how innovation is valued and protected in India."'8 8
79.
Novartis, W.P. Nos. 24759 & 24760 of 2006, at para. 3. Novartis specifically
argued that India's Patents Act violated Article 14 of India's Constitution, which addresses
equal protection under the law. See INDIA CONST., art. 14 ("The State shall not deny to any
person equality before the law or the equal protection of the laws within the territory of
India.").
80.
Novartis, W.P. Nos. 24759 & 24760 of 2006, at para. 5.
81.
See id. at paras. 6-7.
82.
Id. at para. 13.
83.
Id. at para. 16.
84.
Id. at para. 19
85.
Ali K, supra note 31.
86.
Id. India's section 3(d) uses almost identical language as the similar laws of
several of India's fellow WTO members. See infra notes 150-87 and accompanying text.
87.
Anne Moore Odell, A Win for Generic Drugs: Indian Court Rules Against Drug
Maker Novartis, SOC. FUNDS, Aug. 15, 2007, http://www.socialfunds.com/news/article.cgi
2351.html.
88.
Id. (quoting Carrie Scott, spokesperson for Novartis).
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She argued that '[miedical progress occurs through incremental
innovation, and Section 3(d) excludes these important developments,
89
ultimately denying patients in India new and better medicines."'
The High Court's rejection of Novartis's challenge to India's
Patents Act on constitutional grounds and its decision not to address
the TRIPS Agreement claim signal a bold move for the country with
regard to its pharmaceutical industry. Novartis's challenge to India's
Patents Act was the first of its kind and, unless India decides to
amend section 3(d), the country will continue to face pressure from
other WTO members that are home to the pharmaceutical industry. 90
The Indian government is still considering amending section
3(d) to allow for "evergreening," a modification that would reflect an
argument advanced in Novartis's complaint against the Act and that
is also supported by the pharmaceutical industry. 9 1 While an
amendment to the controversial section of India's Patents Act would
render the High Court's interpretation of the Act moot, it would also
reinforce other WTO members' influence over India in relation to
TRIPS and set a precedent for stricter interpretation of the TRIPS
Agreement in relation to other developing countries. In other words,
India's patent law could become more greatly influenced by the
international community than by its own domestic needs and
concerns.

89.

Id. (quoting Carrie Scott, spokesperson for Novartis).
90.
See Praful Bidwai, High Stakes in Attack on Indian Patent Law,
ONEWORLD.NET, Feb. 2, 2007, http://us.oneworld.net/article/view/145742/1/. India had
already received pressure to revise its newly-amended patent laws prior to the Novartis
decision. See Bidwai, supra note 31. India's patent laws had been challenged before in the
WTO Dispute Settlement Board, so the country was particularly cautious in ensuring that
its new Patents Act was TRIPS compliant. See World Trade Organization, India-Patent
Protection for Pharmaceutical and Agricultural Chemical Products, http://www.wto.org/
englishtratop e/dispu e/casese/ds50_e.htm (last updated Jan. 22, 2008). India made its
own attempt to ensure that its new Patents Act was TRIPS compliant. The Indian
government appointed a committee to research the compliance of the Patents Act, which
was ultimately discredited once it became apparent that the Mashelkar Report had been
plagiarized from a study by the UK-based think tank Intellectual Property Institute. The
committee turned out to be funded by Interpat, an association of twenty-nine drug
companies, including Novartis. See Posting of Shamnad Basheer to SPICY IP,
http://spicyipindia.blogspot.com/2007/01/mashelkar-committee-report-on-patents_28.html
(Jan. 28, 2007, 14:16); see also Ravi Sharma & Sara Hiddleston, Mashelkar Committee on
Patent Law Withdraws Report; Seeks More Time, HINDU,
Feb.
22, 2007,
http://www.hindu.com/2007/02/22/stories/2007022206751200.htm.
91.
See Bidwai, supra note 31.
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II. BOLDLY DEFENDING ITS GENERIC INDUSTRY: INDIA RECONCILES ITS
PATENTS ACT WITH HUMAN RIGHTS CONCERNS

The Indian High Court declined to address Novartis's claim
regarding the failure of India's patent laws to conform to the TRIPS
Agreement on jurisdictional grounds. 92 However, India's Patents Act
should still be evaluated in light of the TRIPS Agreement because the
WTO Dispute Settlement Body will likely face the patentability issue
as other pharmaceutical companies attempt to obtain patents for their
drugs in India and other developing countries. 93 As long as India's
Patents Act, particularly section 3(d), satisfies the flexible
requirements outlined in Article 27 of the TRIPS Agreement, then
India has not violated TRIPS because "[m]embers may, but shall not
be obliged to, implement in their law more extensive protection than is
required by [the] Agreement." 94 In short, members may not provide
less legal protection for intellectual property rights than the minimum
standards outlined in the Agreement, although they could
theoretically require more. While India's Patents Act meets the
minimum TRIPS patentability requirements, especially when
considered in light of the Doha Declaration, India should still clarify
its patent standards in order to facilitate international investment in
its pharmaceutical industry, protect public health, and avoid the WTO
Dispute Settlement Body.
A. Why India's Patents Act Is WTO Compliant
Although the language regarding patent standards in the
TRIPS Agreement is often unclear, as long as India's Patents Act is
not any less restrictive than the flexible Article 27 standards, the Act
meets the TRIPS Agreement's requirements. 95 The TRIPS Agreement
uses broad language and only specifies that patents must be made
"available for any inventions, whether products or processes, in all
fields of technology, provided that they are new, involve an inventive
step and are capable of industrial application." 96 Article 27, which
92.
Novartis v. Union of India, W.P. Nos. 24759 & 24760 of 2006, at para. 4
(Madras H.C. June 8, 2007), available at http://judis.nic.in/chennai/qrydisp.asp?tfnm
=11121.
93.
See World Trade Organization, Index of Dispute Issues, http://www.wto.org/
englishtratop-e/dispu-e/dispu-subjects-index-e.htm#patents (last visited Feb. 21, 2008)
(revealing that as of February 21, 2008, the WTO Dispute Body has only handled eleven
cases relating to patents).
94.
TRIPS Agreement, supra note 9, art. 1, 1.
95.
See id.
96.
Id. art. 27, 1.
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defines "patentable subject matter," specifically explains that "the
terms 'inventive step' and 'capable of industrial application' may be
deemed by a Member to be synonymous with the terms 'non-obvious'
and 'useful' respectively." 97 By making this qualification, WTO
members directly echoed the patentability requirements present in
U.S. patent law. 98 However, member states are not required to
interpret the terms according to the U.S. definitions, as evidenced by
the use of "may" instead of "shall."99 Instead, the flexible language
permits members "to fine-tune their inventive-step criteria to reflect
national socioeconomic conditions." 10 0 Since the TRIPS Agreement
clearly allows each member to design its patent laws as it sees fit as
long as the law satisfies Article 27 requirements, each member state
"can decide for itself what they consider to be an 'invention' and
deserving of twenty years of patent protection."' 0'1
Although allowing members latitude to interpret the
requirements of Article 27 in order to tailor patent requirements to
their specific needs seems reasonable, the broad language could also
create confusion and prevent the establishment of uniform
patentability requirements. Since members may, but are not required
to, adopt U.S. definitions regarding patentability requirements,
members may be using the same legal terms with different
interpretations.
Ironically, members' attempts to clarify the
requirements of Article 27 by referencing U.S. patent law terms
renders the already broad language even more ambiguous when one
considers that the U.S. Supreme Court recently redefined the "nonobvious" standard under U.S. law. 10 2 If the basic patentability
requirements under U.S. law are subject to reinterpretation, then it is
unrealistic to expect WTO members to interpret the standards of

97.
Id. art. 27, 1 n.5
98.
See 35 U.S.C. §§ 101-103 (2000) (providing that in order to obtain a patent
under US law, an invention must satisfy the requirements of novelty, non-obviousness, and
utility).
99.
TRIPS Agreement, supra note 9, art. 1 ('Members shall be free to determine the
appropriate method of implementing the provisions of this Agreement within their own
legal system and practice."); see Janice Mueller, Taking TRIPS to India-Novartis,Patent
Law, and Access to Medicines, COMMONWEALTH SECRETARIAT, Feb. 8, 2007,
novartishttp://www.thecommonwealth.org/news/159818/takingtrips-to-india
patent lawand.htm.
100.
Mueller, supra note 99.
101.
Oxfam's Response to the Statement by Novartis, MAKE TRADE FAIR, Feb. 12,
2007, http://maketradefair.com/enlindex.phpfile=a2mnovartis_12022007.htm.
102.
See KSR Int'l Co. v. Teleflex Inc., 127 S. Ct. 1727 (2007); Posting of Bibek
Debroy to The Indian Express, http://www.indianexpress.com/story/209187.html (Aug. 8,
2007, 00:00) ("The US Supreme Court effectively made it more difficult to obtain 'obvious'
patents.").
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novelty, non-obviousness, and utility consistently within their own
patent regimes.
In April 2007, the Supreme Court tightened the requirements
for determining when a combination of existing elements deserves
patent protection in KSR Intern Co. v. Teleflex Inc.10 3 In KSR, an
exclusive licensee of a patent for a position-adjustable vehicle pedal
assembly sued its competitor for infringement. 104 The United States
District Court for the Eastern District of Michigan granted summary
judgment for the competitor on the ground of obviousness and the
licensee appealed 1 0 5 Although the Court of Appeals reversed, the
Supreme Court unanimously held that the patent claim was invalid as
obvious, since mounting an available sensor on a fixed pivot point of
the competitor's pedal "was a design step well within the grasp of a
person of ordinary skill in the relevant art" and the benefit of doing so
06
was obvious.
Even though the KSR case involved the patentability of a
machine component instead of a pharmaceutical, the language of the
opinion is directly relevant to the Indian High Court's decision
rejecting Novartis's patent application. Specifically, the High Court's
determination that the new version of Glivec did not satisfy India's
Patents Law's requirement regarding the "enhancement of a known
efficacy" is analogous to the U.S. Supreme Court's discussion of
obviousness. 10 7 In KSR, Justice Kennedy reasoned that "[g]ranting
patent protection to advances that would occur in the ordinary course
without real innovation retards progress and may, in the case of
patents combining previously known elements, deprive prior
inventions of their value or utility."1 08 The Supreme Court ultimately
relaxed the standards for determining when a requested patent is
obvious, thus reducing the number of patents that companies and
individuals will likely obtain.1 09
The Indian High Court demonstrated a similar reasoning when
it argued that Novartis "is not a novice to the field but on the other

103.
See KSR, 127 S. Ct. at 1746.
104.
Id. at 1734.
105.
Id. at 1737.
106.
Id. at 1746.
107.
See Novartis v. Union of India, W.P. Nos. 24759 & 24760 of 2006, at para. 13
(Madras H.C. June 8, 2007), available at http://judis.nic.in/chennai/qrydisp.asp?tfnm=
11121.
108.
KSR, 127 S. Ct. at 1741.
109.
Anne Broache, Supreme Court Loosens Patent 'Obviousness' Test, CNET
NEWS.coM,
Apr.
30,
2007,
http://www.news.com/Supreme-Court-loosens-patentobviousness-test/2100-1014_3-6180220.html.
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hand it is one of the pharmaceutical giants in the world."'110 In
defending section 3(d) of India's Patents Act, the High Court reasoned
that "[t]he efficacy of a known substance is well-known and it is
111
definitely known to everyone in the pharmaceutical field."
Mirroring the effects of the relaxed obviousness standard for patents
in the U.S., the Indian High Court also likely reduced the amount of
patents that companies like Novartis will obtain if they fail to meet
the efficacy (obvious) standard under India's Patents Act.
Emery Simon, a supporter of the U.S. Supreme Court's KSR
decision and counselor to the Business Software Alliance, argues that
the KSR decision created a "better opportunity for examiners to weed
out patents or applications that are not worthy of getting patents, and
112
it will go a long way toward re-establishing patent quality."
However, in KSR, the Court did not clearly define the exact
requirements for determining obviousness, thus leaving U.S.
standards for determining patentability fairly ambiguous. 113 The
Court's decision indicates that the meaning of the three requirements
of patentability in Article 27114 may vary over time and that different
national governments may adopt different interpretations of those
requirements.
The requirements of India's Patents Act, though broad, are no
less restrictive than the TRIPS Agreement requires and are, therefore,
fully compliant with TRIPS. Specifically, controversial section 3(d) of
India's Patents Act is no less vague than the minimum standards
required in Article 27 of TRIPS. 115 Section 3(d) of India's Patents Act
requires an "enhancement of the known efficacy" of a "new form of a
known substance" and goes on to list specifically the elements that are
considered to be the same substance. 116 In particular, the section
explains:
For the purposes of this clause, salts, esters, ethers, polymorphs, metabolites, pure
form, particle size, isomers, mixtures of isomers, complexes, combinations and
other derivatives of known substances shall be considered to be the same
1 17
substance, unless they differ significantly in properties with regard to efficacy.

110.

Novartis, W.P. Nos. 24759 & 24760 of 2006, at para. 13.

111.

Id.

112.
Broache, supranote 109.
113.
See id.
114.
TRIPS Agreement, supra note 9, art. 27, 1.
115.
Compare The Patents (Amendment) Act, 2005, No. 15, Acts of Parliament,
2005, § 3(d), available at http://www.patentoffice.nic.in/ipr/patent/patent_2005.pdf, with
TRIPS Agreement, supra note 9, art. 27.
116.
The Patents (Amendment) Act, § 3(d).
117.
Id.
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By including this explanation, India wisely clarified what might
otherwise
have
been
completely
ambiguous
patentability
requirements that could have generated arbitrary Indian Patent
Board decisions. 118 Much like the recent U.S. Supreme Court decision
in KSR, the Indian High Court's decision against Novartis merely
determined that one specific patent application did not meet India's
patentability requirements, which, when translated into Article 27
TRIPS language, meant that Glivec was not "new," and that the
alterations to the drug had not constituted an "inventive step" that
was "capable of industrial application."1' 19
Although the Indian High Court did not create a specific test
for determining when the enhanced efficacy requirement would be
met, its methodology is remarkably similar to the logic applied in the
KSR case in which the U.S. Supreme Court did not clearly outline the
criteria for its new "obviousness" test. The Novartis decision could be
viewed as the case that began to set boundaries for India's patent law
and helped to determine criteria regarding efficacy. As the Indian
High Court rules on more challenges to India's Patents Act, the
growing case law will establish clearer guidelines for future patent
seekers.
B. How India's PatentsAct Reconciles the Doha Declarationand
TRIPS Without Relying on Compulsory Licenses
As discussed above, even if the Indian Patents Act is only
analyzed according to the specific language in the TRIPS Agreement
(absent the Doha Declaration), section 3(d) still meets TRIPS's broad
standards regarding patentability. However, in addition to analyzing
India's compliance with the TRIPS Agreement according to the
specific language of the Agreement, the compatibility of India's
Patents Act with TRIPS must also be considered in light of the Doha
118.
Novartis chose not to pursue an argument against section 2(ja) or (ta) of the
Patents Act, which define "inventive step" and "pharmaceutical substance," respectively.
Id. § 2(ja), (ta). The Act defines "inventive step" as "a feature of an invention that involves
technical advance as compared to the existing knowledge or having economic significance
or both and that makes the invention not obvious to a person not skilled in the art." Id. §
20a). The Act's definition of "inventive step" includes a non-obvious requirement that
mirrors exactly the language of the TRIPS Agreement. See TRIPS Agreement, supra note
9, art. 27. The Act defines a "pharmaceutical substance" as "any new entity involving one
or more inventive steps." The Patents (Amendment) Act, § 2(ta). Novartis probably decided
not to object to either of those definitions, which are pertinent to its case involving a
pharmaceutical substance, since both definitions involve an "inventive step," which is
specifically listed as one of the key patentability requirements in Article 27 of the TRIPS
Agreement. See TRIPS Agreement, supra note 9, art. 27, 1.
119.
TRIPS Agreement, supra note 9, art. 27.
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Declaration, which was created to support the "WTO Members' right
to protect public health and, in particular, to promote access to
medicines for all."120 While TRIPS was designed to allow WTO
members interpretive flexibility regarding intellectual property laws,
the Doha Declaration went a step further by emphasizing that "the
TRIPS Agreement does not and should not prevent Members from
taking measures to protect public health." 121
Since the Doha
Declaration was intended to offer additional flexibility with regard to
intellectual property protection, the TRIPS Agreement cannot be
properly interpreted without also considering the object and purpose
of the Doha Declaration.
Realizing the potential conflict between the intellectual
property protection guarantees espoused in the TRIPS Agreement and
the human rights focus of the Doha Declaration, Novartis claimed
that, by bringing its suit against India, it sought to clarify how the two
documents worked together. 122 Novartis argued that the "provisions
and flexibilities" referred to in the Doha Declaration apply to
''compulsory licensing for medicines in case of a national health crisis,"
which Novartis asserted was "completely unrelated to patent laws and
patentability of medicines."1 23 Compulsory licensing is one method
that least developed countries may use to safeguard public health, but
Novartis's statement claiming that compulsory licenses have nothing
to do with patent laws is misleading. Compulsory licenses have
everything to do with patent law since there is no need for a
government to issue them unless patents have already been granted
on essential medications.
Although the Doha Declaration
specifically
mentions
compulsory licenses among the many flexible strategies that it permits
states to employ to protect public health, the list is not exhaustive
24
when read concurrently with the object and purpose of TRIPS.'
Specifically, the introduction to the TRIPS Agreement recognizes "the
special needs of the least-developed country Members" and offers them
''maximum flexibility in the domestic implementation of laws and
regulations in order to enable them to create a sound and viable
technological base. ' 2 5

120.
Doha Declaration, supra note 46, at para. 4.
121.
Id.
122.
Press Release, Novartis, Glivec Patent Case in India: FACT vs. FICTION, at 3,
www.novartis.com/downloads/about-novartis/facts-vs-fiction-india-glivec-patent-case.pdf.
123.
Id.
124.
See TRIPS Agreement, supra note 9, pmbl.; Doha Declaration, supra note 46, at
para. 5(a).
125.
TRIPS Agreement, supranote 9, pmbl.
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Compulsory licenses provide governments with a means of
circumventing patent law for a limited period. 126 Compulsory licenses
may be "granted by the government without the consent of the patent
holder, permitting someone else (or the government itself, which is
then called 'government use') to produce the patented product or use
These licenses serve three main goals: (1)
the process." 127
safeguarding the domestic market supply of a patented product, (2)
promoting competition by establishing domestic competitors, and (3)
promoting a domestic industry. 128 During the negotiations of the
TRIPS Agreement, developing countries wanted to give governments
broad powers to grant compulsory licenses, while developed countries
129
desired an extremely restrictive approach for granting such licenses.
Both groups recognized that the granting of compulsory licenses
translates to a suspension of a patent holder's right, which means that
revenue from the patent will also be suspended in the event of an
emergency.130 Unsurprisingly, developed countries hoped to limit the
granting of these licenses to protect their revenue while developing
countries, many of which had no capability to produce their own
pharmaceuticals, desired to create a system in which compulsory
licenses could be more easily granted, thus insuring the health of their
131
and the world's poorer citizens in times of crisis.
Even though compulsory licenses "are no panacea for the lack
of access to medicine, [they] are a valuable tool in promoting such
access,"132 and India has one of the world's "broadest and most
comprehensive" compulsory license provisions.1 3 3 India's liberal laws
concerning compulsory licenses may prove extremely valuable during
According to the TRIPS Agreement,
public health emergencies.

126.
See id. art. 31(c).
127.
HESTERMEYER, supra note 36, at 239.
128.
Id.; see WTO OMC,Fact Sheet: TRIPS and PharmaceuticalPatents, Sept. 2006,
at
6,
http://www.wto.org/english/tratop-e/trips-e/tripsfactsheet-pharma_2006_- e.pdf
(discussing import and export guidelines related to compulsory licenses under TRIPS)
[hereinafter WTO OMC,Fact Sheet].
129.
See WTO OMC,Fact Sheet, supra note 128, at 6.
130.
This criticism can be avoided if a government issues the license for government
use. See Brook K. Baker, 2007 Victories-Fewer Patents, More Compulsory Licenses: The
Knock-Off Effects of India's Strict PatentAct and Thailand's Compulsory Licenses, HEALTH
GLOBAL ACCESS PROJECT, Dec. 11, 2007, at 2, http://www.healthgap.org/documents/
2007PatentandCLVictories.doc.
131.
See HESTERMEYER, supra note 36, at 239.
Id. at 240 (internal footnote omitted).
132.
Janice M. Mueller, The Tiger Awakens: The Tumultuous Transformation of
133.
India's Patent System and the Rise of Indian Pharmaceutical Innovation 107 (Univ. of
Pittsburg Sch. of Law Working Paper Series, Paper No. 43, 2006), available at
http://Iaw.bepress.com/pittlwps/papers/art43/ (citation omitted).
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compulsory licenses only apply to products and inventions that have
been patented in a particular state and can only be issued under
circumstances governed by Article 31.134
In order to issue a
compulsory license, a government or third party must first attempt to
get authorization from the right holder except in the case of a
"national emergency or other circumstances of extreme urgency," or in
cases of "public, non-commercial use."'135 In addition, "the scope and
duration of such use shall be limited to the purpose for which it was
authorized."'136 Furthermore, Article 31(f) mandates that compulsory
licenses must be granted "predominantly for the supply of the
137
domestic market" of the country granting the compulsory license.
However, the seemingly stringent language of Article 31 takes on a
much more flexible meaning when read concurrently with the Doha
Declaration.
Paragraph 5(c) of the Declaration provides that
[e]ach Member has the right to determine what constitutes a national emergency
or other circumstances of extreme urgency, it being understood that public health
crises, including those relating to HIV/AIDS, tuberculosis, malaria and other
epidemics, can represent a national emergency or other circumstances of extreme
urgency.138

India's current patent law exhibits a trend toward liberally permitting
the issuance of compulsory licenses, including offering them for drugs
that are not available for a "reasonably affordable price.' 1 39 Although
India's patent laws regarding the issuance of compulsory licenses are
140
extremely broad, India has rarely granted them.
India's reluctance
to
grant compulsory
licenses
is
understandable given that India probably does not wish to risk facing
a challenge before the WTO Dispute Settlement Board on the question

134.
See TRIPS Agreement, supra note 9, art. 31.
135.
Id. art. 31(b).
136.
Id. art. 31(c).
137.
Id. art. 31(f); see WTO OMC, Fact Sheet, supra note 128 (providing details about
how the article has been expanded to include countries that lack the capability to produce
their own pharmaceuticals and rely on imports instead).
138.
Doha Declaration, supra note 46, at para. 5(c). The Declaration also recognizes
that some WTO members with "insufficient or no manufacturing capacities in the
pharmaceutical sector could face difficulties in making effective use of compulsory licensing
under the TRIPS Agreement." Id. at para. 6.
139.
The Patents Act, No. 39 of 1970; India Code (1995), § 84 (as amended by The
Patents (Amendment) Act, 1999), available at http://www.patentoffice.nic.in/ipr/patent/
patActl970-3-99.html.
140. * Mueller, supra note 133, at 108. As of November 16, 2005, India's Patent Office
admitted to issuing less than six compulsory licenses over the entire existence of the Indian
patent regime. Id. at 109. These low numbers are likely partially attributable to India's
previous patent law (before 2005) which did not require patents for pharmaceuticals. Id.
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of its laws' compliance with the TRIPS Agreement's compulsory
license requirements. After all, the Doha Declaration clearly does not
allow members to disregard the TRIPS Agreement,14 1 and it is still
unclear exactly how the two can be harmoniously interpreted.
However, it would clearly be against the object and purpose of the
TRIPS Agreement for India to circumvent TRIPS's requirements by
declaring numerous public health "emergencies" and granting
compulsory licenses for its patented drugs. Although the Doha
Declaration allows members to determine "what constitutes a national
emergency," this safeguard must not be abused if India hopes to avoid
opposition from developed WTO member-countries. 142 Indeed, India
should reserve issuing compulsory licenses for clear public health
143
emergencies in order to avoid overusing the important safeguard.
By sidestepping its compulsory license laws, India may have
successfully, and perhaps unintentionally, reconciled the Doha
Declaration and the TRIPS Agreement through the careful
construction of section 3(d) of the Patents Act.
Since the WTO has not yet determined exactly how compulsory
licenses may be granted without violating either TRIPS or the Doha
Declaration, India has attempted to preserve its autonomy as a
generic drug superpower by avoiding the issue of compulsory licenses,
instead focusing its attention on reworking its patentability
standards, as exemplified in section 3(d). The Doha Declaration
specifies that compulsory licenses are one method that members may
use "to promote access to medicines for all,"144 but members must also
read the Declaration in light of the object and purpose of the TRIPS
Agreement, which includes allowing least developed countries
"maximum flexibility" in implementing their domestic laws. 145 Section
3(d) promotes such "maximum flexibility" by attempting to prevent
patent evergreening while allowing incremental innovation of already146
existing products as long as their efficacy is sufficiently enhanced.
Therefore, when read in light of both the TRIPS Agreement and the
141.
Doha Declaration, supra note 46, at para. 5(a).
142.
See id. at para. 5(c).
143.
In determining the types of epidemics that qualify as national emergencies,
India should focus on paragraph 1 of the Doha Declaration, which specifically recognizes
"HIV/AIDS, tuberculosis, malaria and other epidemics" as grave threats to public health.
Id. at para. 1. Governments still face opposition from developed countries even when they
issue compulsory licenses for the diseases enumerated in the Doha Declaration. See infra
note 183.
144.
Doha Declaration, supra note 46, at para. 4.
145.
TRIPS Agreement, supra note 9, pmbl.
146.
See The Patents (Amendment) Act, 2005, No. 15, Acts of Parliament, 2005, §
3(d), available at http://www.patentoffice.nic.in/ipr/patent/patent_2005.pdf.
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Doha Declaration, section 3(d) satisfies TRIPS's requirements and
presents a method for developing countries to apply favorably the
requirements of both agreements without relying too heavily on
compulsory licenses.
Although Novartis claimed that it brought its suit against
India, at least partially, to clarify how TRIPS and the Doha
Declaration worked together, 147 Novartis clearly wanted its
application for Glivec granted to ensure that India would interpret its
Patents Act more liberally and grant more patents for
pharmaceuticals. 148 If India had granted Novartis's patent for Glivec
and then attempted to issue a compulsory license on the patented
drug, Novartis would have been in a much better position to oppose
India's action since it would already have legal rights under both
Indian patent law and the TRIPS Agreement. Because the legal
foundations for granting compulsory licenses are limited to a narrow
set of circumstances and there are often political obstacles to granting
such licenses, even when read in light of the Doha Declaration, it is in
the best interest of pharmaceutical companies to pursue patents on as
many drugs or variations of drugs as possible with the knowledge that
they will have guaranteed legal protection under a given state's patent
law and TRIPS. 149 In short, it is better to be a rights holder subject to
the risk of compulsory licenses than not to be a rights holder at all.
Instead of interpreting India's Patents Act to allow for such
possibilities, the Indian High Court dashed Novartis's hopes -for
establishing a precedent favorable to the pharmaceutical industry
when it upheld section 3(d).

147.
Press Release, Novartis, supranote 122.
148.
The High Court's decision against Novartis had exactly the effect on the
pharmaceutical industry that Novartis sought to avoid. "[Wlith Novartis's defeat, the
pharmaceutical industry began to strategically review its mailbox filings, and its new
filings as well, to weed out the clearly unmeritorious applications." Baker, supra note 130,
at 1. "The most recent example is further withdrawals by GlaxoSmithKline of two ARV
patent applications, on Abacavir and Trizivir." See id.; see also Novartis v. Union of India,
W.P. Nos. 24759 & 24760 of 2006 (Madras H.C. June 8, 2007), available at
http://judis.nic.in/chennai/qrydisp.asp?tfnm=11121 (providing an overview of both sides'
arguments before the Indian High Court).
149.
Once a pharmaceutical company secures a patent in a country, it often goes out
of its way to prevent the issuance of a compulsory license by negotiating with the country
and lowering the price of its drug. See Brazilian President Silva Issues Compulsory License
for Merck's Antiretroviral Efavirenz, MED. NEWS
TODAY, May 9, 2007,
http://www.medicalnewstoday.com/articles/70154.php.
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C. Examining Other WTO Members'PatentLaws Post-Novartis
Recognizing that the Novartis decision has far-reaching
implications not just for Indian patent law, but also for the equivalent
laws of all WTO members, this section compares the controversial
passages of India's Patents Act to similar sections contained in other
Since the TRIPS
prominent WTO members' patent laws. 15 0
Agreement was developed "to narrow the gaps in the way [intellectual
property] rights are protected around the world, and to bring them
under common international rules," all members are equally
responsible for enforcing a uniform system of standards for
intellectual property protection. 151 India's Patents Act has been
subjected to international scrutiny regarding its compliance with the
TRIPS Agreement since it was amended in 2005, and the debate
intensified following the Novartis decision. The tension between the
developed countries that house the pharmaceutical industry and the
third world was highlighted in the Novartis decision since nearly forty
countries have granted patents for the beta crystal form of Glivec,
152
while India decided that the new form did not warrant a patent.
Although it is important to compare India's Patents Act to the
standards set forth in the TRIPS Agreement, it is equally important to
compare India's new patent regime to similar laws of its fellow WTO
members whose patent laws have not faced such strict scrutiny in the
A direct comparison between India's
international spotlight. 153
"enhanced efficacy" standard regarding "new forms of a known
substance" and equivalent laws of other WTO members reveals that
both the language and intent behind section 3(d) of India's Patents Act
is extremely similar to the patentability requirements contained in
other prominent members' laws. 15 4 Therefore, if India's Patents Act

This section examines the equivalent laws of other WTO members on a purely
150.
textual level and does not address surrounding case law since it is beyond the focus of this

note. Furthermore, an examination of other members' case law would not serve as a fair
comparison with India's Patents Act since India has not had an opportunity to develop its
case law as extensively as other member states.
World Trade Organization, Intellectual Property: Protection and Enforcement,
151.
supra note 43.
152.
See Novartis.com, Frequently Asked Questions, supra note 73.
See Posting of Shamnad Basheer to SPICY IP, supra note 90 (explaining that
153.
the Mashelkar Committee was in part established to compare India's new Patents Act to
similar laws of other WTO Members).
154.
See supra Part II(C). This section only compares other WTO members' laws to
section 3(d) of India's Patents Act since it was the primary subject of contention in the
Novartis case.

790

VANDERBILTJ. OFENTERTAINMENTAND TECH.LAW [Vol. 10:3:763

does not satisfy TRIPS's requirements, the patent regimes of other
WTO members are equally suspect.
1. United States Patent Law
United States patentability requirements are broad and offer
little qualification on their face. 155 Specifically, the law provides that
"[w]hoever invents or discovers any new and useful process, machine,
manufacture, or composition of matter, or any new and useful
improvement thereof, may obtain a patent therefor, subject to the
conditions and requirements of this title."'156 Since a patent may be
granted for "new and useful improvements" to already-patented
inventions, U.S. patent law clearly allows for incremental innovation;
however, the exact standards for determining what constitutes a
"new" or "useful improvement" are not contained in the statute
157
itself.
The U.S. Patent and Trademark Office elaborates on U.S.
patentability requirements and asserts that "[t]he subject matter
sought to be patented must be sufficiently different from what has
been used or described before that it may be said to be nonobvious to a
person having ordinary skill in the area of technology related to the
invention." 158 The office places limits on what may be patented on the
grounds of "obviousness" by disallowing minor, insignificant changes
in an already-patented invention. 159 Specifically, the office explains
that "the substitution of one color for another, or changes in size, are
ordinarily not patentable. 160 In this manner, the U.S. protects the
ability of patent applicants to improve upon already-existing
16
inventions while preventing the practice of patent evergreening. 1
Indian law attempts to strike this same balance by disallowing a

155.
See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8 (allowing for the granting of patents "[t]o
promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors
and Inventors the exclusive Right to their respective Writings and Discoveries"); see also 35
U.S.C. §§ 101-103 (2000) (describing specific patent requirements).
156.
35 U.S.C. § 101 (emphasis added).

157.

Id.

158.
United States Patent and Trademark Office, General Information Concerning
Patents, http://www.uspto.gov/go/pac/doc/general/#novelty (revised Jan. 2005).

159.
Id.
160.
Id.
161.
U.S. patent law is much more detailed when considered in the larger context of
case law and the huge number of patents that the Patent and Trademark Office has issued.
This section analyzes the language of U.S. law on a purely textual level in order to compare
it to the text of India's controversial section 3(d). See id. for a more detailed overview of the
complexities and nuances of U.S. patent law.
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patent on "a new form of a known substance which does not result in
162
the enhancement of the known efficacy of that substance."'
2. United Kingdom Patent Law
The United Kingdom allows patents for inventions that are
"new," involve an "inventive step," and are "capable of industrial
application." 163 The U.K. Intellectual Property Office explains that "a
claim to a tablet of a particular shape or structure would be acceptable
if this resulted in a particularly favourable release profile for the
active agent."'164 The office does not elaborate on what qualifies as a
"particularly favourable release," but instead goes on to specify that if
an alteration to an already-patented substance's "new shape or form is
merely presentational or conveys information . . . , then it represents
either an aesthetic creation or a mere presentation of information,"
which "are not in themselves patentable." 165 In other words, the U.K.
has allowed for patentable incremental innovation of pharmaceutical
substances while protecting against evergreening by preventing the
patenting of merely "aesthetic creations."'166 The U.K. does not define
"particularly favourable release," much like the Indian Patents Act
does not define "significantly . . with regard to efficacy."
For
clarification, one must turn to either country's case law or other
instances in which the patent offices of the countries have granted
patents using their respectively broad language in order to determine
what .new developments in already-patented substances qualify for
new patents.
3. Chinese Patent Law
In order for an invention to qualify for a patent in China, it
"must possess novelty, inventiveness and practical applicability."1 67

162.
The Patents (Amendment) Act, 2005, No. 15, Acts of Parliament, 2005, § 3(d),
available at http://www.patentoffice.nic.in/ipr/patent/patent_2005.pdf.
163.
The Patents Act, 1977, c. 37, § 1(1)(a)-(c) (Eng.) available at
http://www.ipo.gov.uklpatentsact1977.pdf.
164.

U.K. INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY OFFICE, EXAMINING

PATENT APPLICATIONS

RELATING TO MEDICAL INVENTIONS IN THE UK INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY OFFICE para. 144,
at 46 (June 2007), http://www.ipo.gov.uk/medicalguidelines.pdf [hereinafter EXAMINING
PATENT APPLICATIONS].

165.
Id.
166.
Id.
167.
Patent Law of the People's Republic of China (adopted by the Standing
Comm. Nat'l People's Cong., Mar.
12, 1984),
art. 22,
available at
http://www.chinatrademarkoffice.com/aboutlaws2.jsp#2 (last visited Feb. 21, 2008)
(hereinafter China Patent Law).
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The law specifically qualifies "inventiveness" by defining a new
invention as one that demonstrates "prominent substantive features
and represents a notable progress." 168 The law does not specifically
explain what new features of an already-patented invention satisfy
"inventiveness"
of the
progress" component
"notable
the
Similarly to the Indian Patents Act, Chinese
requirement.169
patentability requirements remain broad and allow for examination of
inventions on a case-by-case basis.
When compared to other prominent WTO Members'
patentability requirements, section 3(d) of India's Patents Act contains
India's "enhanced
similarly broad and unqualified language. 170
the
U.S.'s "useful
as
efficacy" requirement is equally as broad
improvement" language, the U.K.'s "particularly favourable release"
progress" patentability
"notable
China's
and
requirement,
requirement.171 Even when directly compared with the patentability
requirements of India's fellow WTO members, the Indian Patents Act
is just as compliant or non-compliant with the TRIPS Agreement's
standards as other members' laws.
III. A HEALTHY SOLUTION FOR INDIA AND OTHER DEVELOPING
COUNTRIES

India should stand by section 3(d) of its Patents Act and not
succumb to international pressure to recreate its patent regime
according to the interests of both pharmaceutical companies and
developed countries. Instead, India's Patent Office should attempt to
clarify its patentability standards by providing a more detailed Web
site that would explain and give at least one example of a known
substance that demonstrates an enhanced efficacy, thus meriting a
patent. Additionally, India should continue to preserve its role as a
valued pharmacy to the third world by carefully scrutinizing patent
applications to help prevent evergreening. Finally, other developing
countries should follow India's lead by maintaining their compliance
with the TRIPS Agreement's and the Doha Declaration's standards,

168.
169.
170.

Id.
Id.
See The Patents (Amendment) Act, 2005, No. 15, Acts of Parliament, 2005, §

3(d), availableat http://www.patentoffice.nic.ini/ipr/patent/patent_2005.pdf.
See 35 U.S.C. § 101 (2000); EXAMINING PATENT APPLICATIONS, supra note 164,
171.
at para. 144, at 46; China Patent Law, supra note 167, art. 22.
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while enacting stricter patent regimes instead of relying heavily on
172
compulsory licenses.
Novartis's case against the Indian government subjected the
Indian Patents Act to scrutiny from the developed world. While the
broad language of section 3(d) is compliant with TRIPS's standards
when compared directly to TRIPS's language, the Doha Declaration,
and similar laws of other WTO members, it would still be prudent for
the Indian government to clarify which types of innovations to
already-patented inventions satisfy the "substantially enhanced
efficacy" requirement. Had the Indian High Court offered some
guidance on how "enhancements might be quantified, such as in terms
of fewer side-effects or lower dosages," 173 then the government would
be able to better defend the language of section 3(d).
Ideally, India's Patent Office should demystify the entire
patenting process by providing guidelines and instructions on how to
search for patentable substances on its Web site, much the like U.S.
Patent and Trademark Office exhibits on its detailed site. 74 More
detailed information regarding patent requirements from India's
Patent Office would be especially helpful given that India's Patents
Act is not supplemented with extensive case history or judicial
interpretations like many of its fellow WTO members that have older,
more established patent regimes. Although other WTO members'
laws contain similarly vague language concerning their patentability
requirements, the developed countries of the world are able to
reinforce their requirements with case law and numerous examples of

172.

Some developing countries have already recognized the powerful implications of

section 3(d) of India's Patents Act and have begun modeling their laws on India's. See
Gireesh Chandra Prasad, Copycats PoppingPatent Law Pill, ECON. TIMES, Aug. 13, 2007,
http://economictimes.indiatimes.com/News/News By-Industry/Healthcare-Biotech/Pharm
aceuticals/Copycats-popping-patent lawpill/articleshow/2276358.cms ('More than 10
countries in the Asia-Pacific region are planning to adopt the much-debated provision
which makes it difficult for drug makers to get patent protection for anything less than
breakthroughs in pharmaceutical research. The provision describes what sort of
pharmaceutical substance is worthy of a patent. The idea is to prevent companies from
blocking the entry of cheaper rival products by passing off old medicines in new bottles as
patent-worthy inventions.").
173.
Novartis Patent Challenge Dismissed in India,supra note 1.
174.
See, e.g., United States Patent and Trademark Office Home Page,
http://www.uspto.gov/main/patents.htm (last visited Feb. 21, 2008) (indicating the type of
information that could be exhibited on the Indian Patent Office's Site). Although India has
a Web site for its Patent Office, the information available on the site is limited and, as of
February 21, 2008, contained no information relating to explanations or interpretations of
patentability requirements. See Office of Controller General of Patents, Designs and
Trademarks Home Page, http://www.patentoffice.nic.in/ (last visited Feb. 21, 2008).
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both approved and denied patent applications. 175 As is the case with
other developing countries, India's patent regime is so new that more
guidance regarding its specific requirements is needed in order to
facilitate better investment and trade relations with other WTO
Members.
The patentability requirements set forth in section 3(d) of the
Patents Act reveal the Indian government's clear desire to promote
incremental
innovation
while
discouraging frivolous
patent
176
evergreening.
Unfortunately, it is difficult to distinguish between
the two practices on paper since each "enhancement" to an alreadypatented invention must be evaluated on a case-by-case basis.1 77 In
some respects, it is important for patent law language to remain broad
so that it does not limit invention. India is on the right track with its
Patents Act, but India's Patent Office should expand upon the
language of section 3(d) to include at least one example of a previously
known substance that demonstrates an "enhancement of the known
efficacy" of the substance. Doing so would prevent a flood of futile
patent applications and clarify its laws for future applicants.
Although India is currently considering amending the
controversial language of section 3(d), the government should not fold
to criticism from developed WTO members. If India amends its patent
law again, the action would signal major vulnerability within the
Indian patent regime and could open the door to even more challenges
and amendments following other denied patent applications. India's
patent law, while new, measures up to similar laws of its fellow WTO
members, and the Indian government should stand behind it as
such. 78 While India's hesitancy to defend its Patents Act vigorously is
understandable given the country's limited experience with product
patents, now is the time for the Indian government to project
confidence in its patent regime. As more case law is generated and
India's Patent Office grants more patents, the requirements of section
3(d) will become clearer.
On the reverse side, pharmaceutical
companies should not be discouraged from submitting more patent
applications, but should instead view each application as an

175.
See United States Patent and Trademark Office Home Page, supra note 174
(displaying numerous instructions, manuals, and methods of searching for patents); see
also U.K. Intellectual Property Office Home Page, http://www.ipo.gov.uk/ (last visited Feb.
21, 2008) (providing links to numerous patentability searches).
176.
See Ali K, supra note 31.
177.
A. B. Rajasekaran, Indian Patent Law-Needed, ProperDefinition of 'Inventive
Step,'

HINDU

Bus.

LINE,

Apr.

13,

2007,

http://www.thehindubusinessline.com

2007/04/13/stories/2007041300930800.htm.
178.
See supra notes 170-71 and accompanying text.
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opportunity to learn specifics about the types of new or "enhanced"
substances that the government deems patentable.
Although India would inspire more confidence in its new patent
regime if it began granting patents on a more regular basis, one
should expect the Indian Patent Office to move slowly and cautiously
in granting patents as its employees accustom themselves to the new
concepts and standards.
India is not averse to granting
pharmaceutical patents, as evidenced by the patents it has already
granted for a Hepatitis C medicine and for an HIV/AIDS drug,
Celzentry. 179 However, the country is understandably hesitant to
grant too many patents too soon given its concern with protecting its
successful and critical generic market and its status as the "Pharmacy
180
of the Third World."'
Novartis was adamant in asserting that its case against India
was not about compulsory licenses,' 8 ' yet the company would have
been in a much stronger legal position if India had granted a patent
for Glivec and then attempted to issue a compulsory license for the
drug. Knowing this, Novartis made it clear that it "fully supports
flexibilities in the TRIPS agreement that allow governments to make
exceptions to patent rights and import pharmaceuticals produced
under compulsory license in case of a national emergency or a lack of
supply from the patent-holder.' 1 2 Although the WTO recognizes the
need for compulsory licenses in order to combat threats to global
health such as HIV/AIDS and the avian flu, it still discourages the
18 3
extended use of such licenses.
As it is not yet clear exactly how the TRIPS Agreement and the
Doha Declaration reconcile the ability of WTO members to issue

179.
Mueller, supra note 99; Pfizer Gets HIV Drug Patent in India; Share Up 7.5%,
ECON. TIMES, Dec. 11, 2007, http://economictimes.indiatimes.com/StocksinNews/
Pfizer-getsHIV_drug-patentlin Indiashare-up_75/articleshow/2613859.cms.
180.
Novartis Boycott Campaign, Petition, http://novartisboycott.org/petition/ (last
visited Feb. 21, 2008).
181.
Press Release, Novartis, supra note 122, at 1.
182.
Id.
183.
See
Posting
of
Anne
to
Pierce
Law
IP
News
Blog,
http://ipnewsblog.com/index.php/2007/01/25/thailand-issues-compulsory-licenses-for.
kaletra-and-plavix/ (Jan 25, 2007, 15:28); see also Brazilian President Silva Issues
Compulsory License For Merck's Antiretroviral Efavirenz, supra note 149; WHO Cautions
Thailand Against Issuing Compulsory License For Abbott's Antiretroviral Kaletra, MED.
NEWS
TODAY,
Feb.
7,
2007,
http://www.medicalnewstoday.com/articles/
62396.php. Although major pharmaceutical companies frequently oppose government use
of compulsory licenses, companies usually attempt to prevent the government from issuing
licenses by offering their product to the country for a discounted price. See Brazilian
PresidentSilva Issues Compulsory License For Merck's AntiretroviralEfavirenz, supra note
149.
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compulsory licenses in cases of national emergency, as defined by the
state declaring the emergency, India has avoided losing a potential
WTO challenge to its broad laws on the subject by not invoking
them.18 4 The WTO would likely take issue with an Indian attempt to
issue compulsory licenses, on the basis of price, on patented medicines
for potentially limitless periods.1 8 5 Instead of making use of its liberal,
but almost certainly challengeable compulsory licensing laws, India
has chosen to limit the number of patents it grants by wording section
3(d) carefully in order to prevent evergreening18 6 In this manner,
India has successfully demonstrated a legal option for other
developing countries that are unable to afford patented medicines or
to produce their own generic versions of patented medications.
Instead of predominately relying on compulsory licensing to
protect public health, more developing countries should follow India's
example and create stricter patent laws that prevent evergreening
while still adhering to the requirements and allowances of TRIPS and
the Doha Declaration. 8 7
After all, if a government is more
discriminating in determining which substances are patentable, then
fewer patents will be granted and the need to rely on compulsory
licenses will decrease. Additionally, pharmaceutical companies will be
further discouraged from attempting to evergreen their products at
the expense of patients. Instead, drug developers will be encouraged
to create substances that demonstrate true advances in effectiveness
and/or previously unknown and valid second uses for existing
substances.
IV. CONCLUSION

India has been wisely cautious in granting patents for
pharmaceuticals. Its decision not to grant Novartis's patent for Glivec
is evidence of its dedication to preserving its role as a third world
medicine supplier, all the while upholding the requirements of the
TRIPS Agreement.1 8 8 Had Novartis won its case against the Indian
government, it could have opened the door to establishing a broader
practice of granting patents for inventions that resulted from

184.
See supra Part II(B).
185.
See supra notes 141-42 and accompanying text.
186.
See id.
187.
See Prasad, supra note 172 ("More than 10 countries in the Asia-Pacific region
are planning to adopt the much-debated provision which makes it difficult for drug makers
to get patent protection for anything less than breakthroughs in pharmaceutical
research.").
188.
See supra Part II.A.
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evergreening.' 8 9 As long as India continues to abide by TRIPS's
standards, while continuing to clarify the patentability standards
contained in section 3(d) of the Patents Act, the Indian High Court's
decision should not be challenged in the WTO Dispute Settlement
Body.
Although India's Patents Act satisfies TRIPS's requirements,
the broad language of section 3(d) requires clarification. 190 If India's
Patent Office would provide patent seekers with some minimal
guidance regarding the type of previously known substance that
exhibits a patent-worthy enhanced efficacy, then applicants would be
able to determine the probability of their application's success. 191 A
more transparent patenting process would increase the efficiency of
the system and reinforce the legitimacy of India's patent regime. As
more patent applications are approved and denied and more case law
is generated, patent seekers in India will find increasingly greater
requirements. 192
patentability
Indian
regarding
clarity
Pharmaceutical companies must be patient with India while the
country's Patent Office familiarizes itself with new legal concepts.
India's patent process remains slow as the country attempts to
navigate its way through challenging legal concepts, conflicting WTO
guidance exhibited in both the TRIPS Agreement and the Doha
Declaration, and international pressure to amend its patent laws. 193
However, despite these major hurdles, India has discovered a legal
method with which to preserve its role as a powerful generic drug
manufacturer.' 94 Instead of relying on its vast compulsory licensing
laws, which would likely face WTO challenges given the broad range
of reasons that India allows for granting them, India chose to limit
carefully the number of patents it grants for new forms of known
substances in order to prevent patent evergreening. 195 Although
section 3(d) of India's Patents Act may seem particularly ambiguous,
it is almost identical in both wording and purpose to similar laws of
other WTO Members. 196 Thus, before other countries criticize the
most controversial portion of India's patent law, they should
reevaluate the wording and reasoning behind their own equivalent
laws.
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191.
192.
193.
194.
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Bidwai, supra note 31.
Novartis Patent ChallengeDismissed in India, supra note 1.
Bidwai, supra note 31.
supra note 175 and accompanying text.
Posting of Bibek Debroy, supra note 102.
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Other developing countries would benefit from following India's
example by espousing confidence in their own patent laws instead of
relying on emergency compulsory licenses, which almost always face
severe opposition from powerful companies and developed countries.
India's bold handling of the Novartis case reveals that developing
countries are capable of standing up to developed countries on human
rights issues while satisfying their international legal obligations.
India's legal solution turned out to be a healthy one as well.
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